T he most difficult' clinical, ethi.caI, and legal issues arise when we ask whether or when it is justified to withhold or discontinue aggressive life support, to allow persons with irreversibly deteriorating bodies, nervous systems, or brains to die. An issue, one should-note, is a question or protlem that elicits conflicting answers or solu-. tions. The conflict centring on questions about how best to care for terminally ill patients is most . vigorous when we ask if it is ever justifiable to help a patient die rapidly, presuming general agreement that aggressive life-prolonging treatment is no longer in a particular patient's best . interests. The attempt to resolve these issues may reveal the strongest tensions between the principles of philosophic and medical ethics, the current state of the law and jurisprudence, the maxims of clinical experience, and the various moral perceptions and persuasions of people in societies as highly pluralistic as our own.
THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE
If confusion, the brainwashing influence of other persons, and pathologic depression could be excluded, many would hold to the principle that "the will of the patient, not the health of the patient, should be the supreme law" (1) governing decisions about.initiating or discontinuing life-prolongation measures. In the same vein, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has proposed an amendment to the, criminal code to prohibit any relevant paragraph of the code from being interpreted as requiring a physician"to continue to administer or to undertake medical treatment against the expressed wishes of the person for whom such treatment is intended." (2) .
This clear and reasonable principle may conflict sharply with strongly held clinical perceptions and certain dominant values in our culture. We iI1freasingly give public support to patient autonomy and the value of self-determination against the potential abuse of medical technology. However, we do not always find it easy to live accord-ing to the same categories in which we think. People can generally agree on the justification of abandoning life-prolonging procedures' when a patient's loss of consciousness is irreversible. Many, however, experience a strong visceral opposition to discontinuing or withholding lifeprolongation treatment -whether this be respiratory support, chemotherapy, or total parenteral nutrition .... from an intelligent, conscious, and lucid patient.
This spontaneous opposition may be reinforced by bonds to the patient forged during the earlier fight for life. Decisive and distressed family members may intensify the difficulty of respecting a' patient's refusal of life support. Moreover, one may wonder if a patient's refusal of life support is not tantamount to suicide. And if it is, should such a refusal always be opposed? Of course, we have come to define death in terms of neurological criteria. How difficult it can be to withhold or stop life-prolonging treatment when this is seen as equivalent to destroying a perfectly functioning brain. Is a professional ever justified in collaborating with a request to do that?
THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
The proportionality principle, expressed and strongly supported in the Canadian Law Reform Commission's i~commendation that the criminal code not bind physicians to administer therapeutically useless treatments or treatments in conflict with a patient's best interests (3), is widely known and theoretically uncontroversiaI. The Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia supports both the principle of self-determination and proportionality ethics with its observation that:
One cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is already in use but carries a risk or is burdensome. Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary. it should be considered as an acceptance of the human condition. or a 'wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure disproportionate to the results that. can ,.' be expected.ior a.desire notto impose excessive expense on the family or the community W: ' Some who have little difficulty in accepting proportionality ethics as a basis for stopping respirators or chemotherapy balk at discontinuing such-a basic support as' nutrition. Though many would accept that the ultimate aim of total parenteral nutrition "is to prolong meaningfulhfe. and not to prolong the process of an inevitable death" (5) , others hold to the conviction that' "for wilfulstarvation there. can be no .excpse." (6) .
, Feeding is surely a powerful symbolic expression . of human solidarity. Nevertheless, appellate courts in three states of the United States have recently agreed that there is no legal difference between, artificial feeding and any other medical treatment . ' (7) . Proportionalityethics should work for artificial feeding as well as it does for respirators and chemotherapy. Yet, if stopping treatment, in clinically similar conditions, is ethically no different from never starting it (8), this may not easily be reconciled with feelings and perceptions. They' may differ regarding initiation and discontinuance of treatment from the principle described.rhe . "executioner perception'; should not be simply brushed aside. Physicians, and others as well, may experience an intolerable discord between a principled,justification for discontinuing life-prolonging treatment and the personal perception .that one , has become a killer in so doing.
THE PAIN' CONTROL PRINCIPLE
Morally justifiable acts in one kind of relationship -may be immoral in another. Tn-f doctor-patient relationship justifies high-risk invasions of the bodily integrity of human beings.iacts that would be criminal outside this relationship. What does the medical mandate justify when apatient is deteriorating beyond medicine's power to cure? Are there any moral limits, to the measu~es a patient may request, or a doctor may use, to alleviate pain, suffering, and a lingering process of dying?
The ethical distinction between killing the pain ' and killing the patient is clear in principle. It is not always so clear in practice. Both thq, Canadian Law Reform Commission and the Canadian Paediatric. Society affirm the justifiability of.administering analgesics required to control pain, even if these reduce life-expectancy (9) or hasten death (10). The ethical reasoning is clear. Adequate control of pain. is an integral part of living,' If shortening of life results from dosages required to relieve pain, this does not mean that the administration -of the analgesics was a termination of life by overdose. It means only that the patient could no longer tolerate the therapy that is necessary for a tolerable life. Perceptions, of course, may be out of place with principles, and some may find it difficult to shake the feeling that they have really killed the patient to kill the pain. ' . J
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DOMINION P~INCIPLE
The film "Breaker Morant" demonstrated the thesis that, in war, situations arise that fall outside all existing rules. Similar situations seem to arise from timeto time in caring for the terminally ill. If decisions to stop~l l l i fe-proi oni i ng treatm~nt and to allow "nature.. to take its course". are morally and legally justifiable; should not society, as Dr John Freeman asked over ten years ago, allow physicians to help nature take its coursequickly? (1:1) How is such a question to be answered? By measuring the proportion of benefits to damages?
The focus then would be on the patient. ·If the patient is bound to die, given the irreversibility of .a lethal disease and the rightness of a decision 'not to intervene to prolong life, of what good to the patient, family, or to anyone is an interim period of slow decline into death? Why should patients, families, and care-givers be bound passively to await death?
Do we answer the question by considering longterm consequences? Here the focus would be on the medical profession and society. Should a society give such power to doctors, or to any profession? There are many kinds of suffering, and , there are suffere"rs of all ages. If we justify active euthanasia for some patients on the grounds of mercy.' is it possible to establish generally acceptable and non-arbitrary limits to the putative medical mandate to shorren r'useless dying curves" by direct termination of life? Do we try this as an experiment, and closely monitorwhat happens? Or do we, in the fear that "things might get-out of hand," arbitrarily decree that no one, doctors included, is ever morally justified in terminating a patient's life? ' Some, many-perhaps, would argue that such a decree is not arbitrary at all. It is simply the expression of the most basic of all priciples: that no human being has dominion .over the life of another. Dominion claimed and dominion exercised over the life of another human being is not dominion justified. Judges, philosophers, and religious leaders have reiterated their principle in various ways over the ages.
That fact, however, does not silence the guestions. How do we know that this principle should hold, and should hold without exception? How can the constraint of the dominion principle be . , justified, when the act it prohibits,active euth~na sia, appears, in some circumstances, desirable from every empirical point of view, and is, in fact, desired by everyone involved in a particular case? Is the authority of reason able to resolve this' ,> most important of our ethical questions, or does the dominion principle and its prohibition of active , euthanasia rest rather on a belief?
.ETHICS: A TEST OF OUR MORAL TRADITIONS Each clinical case, particularly those involving lifedeath decisions, brings thousands of years of cultural and moral tradition to bear on this particular human crisis. The principles of the great philosophers, the moral traditions of medicine and the world's religions, and the moral common sense of preceding generations pass more or less clearly thwugh the prism of a small circle of minds gathered from around this patient to illuminate the one governing question of the moment: how can we help this person live or die in a fashion that· honours his or her dignity and ours 'as well?
The pressure of these decisions and of the acts they require forces moral traditions, as they pass through our minds focussed on this particular , human crisis, to reveal the best they have to offer. , Philosophical and moral traditions are challenged, in-the arena of intensive and palliative care, to come down from the high 'heavens of abstract discourse and take a stand .on what should be done now, when the decision is decisive for this patient's future and the consequences are irreversible.
